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This paper takes a mechanism design approach to federalism and assumes
that local preferences are the private information of local jurisdictions. Con-
tractual federalism is de￿ned as a strategy-proof contract among the members
of the federation supervised by a benevolent but not omniscient federal au-
thority. We show that even if the size of the information to be elicited is min-
imal, the incentive compatibility constraint has a bite in terms of ￿ exibility
and welfare. Strategy-proof and e¢ cient federal mechanisms are necessar-
ily uniform. There exists ine¢ cient and non-uniform strategy-proof mech-
anisms, but they are socially worse than non cooperative decentralization.
Federal mechanisms which are neutral and robust to coalition manipulations
are equivalent to voting rules on uniform policies.
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: D71, D72, D82, H77
Keywords: Federalism, Asymmetric Information, Strategy-proofness,
Externality, Coordination, Uniformity.1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Oates (1972), most models of federalism assume
that under centralization. local policies cannot be di⁄erentiated to local con-
ditions: centralized policies are necessarily uniform across local jurisdictions.
Several informal justi￿cations have been proposed for this ad-hoc assumption,
among others equity considerations, constitutional constraints or organiza-
tional rigidities. As intuitive as it is, the uniformity assumption has been
recently criticized by several authors.1 Although there is some empirical ev-
idence that more centralized federal systems have more uniform policies, the
rationale underlying the rigidity of central interventions is far from clear.
The principles of contractual federalism suggest a more ￿ exible approach:
centralization should be thought as a general mechanism, a grand social con-
tract among the members of a federation supervised by a neutral federal
administration. A priori, there is no reason why its range should be re-
stricted to uniform policies. However, as political scholars and economists
have argued for long (e.g. Tocqueville 1835, Hayek 1945, Musgrave 1959),
the information about local circumstances and preferences is typically de-
centralized. Local jurisdictions have an informational advantage over federal
administrations and their private information is typically unveri￿able.2 Un-
der those informational constraints, the decentralized information has to be
elicited via the federal mechanism. The resulting incentive compatibility
constraints restrict the set of feasible federal interventions. The aim of this
paper is to assess the bite of the information asymmetry between the federal
and the local level and investigates in particular if it can provide a rational
for the rigidities of centralized policies.
Technically, the restrictions imposed by incentive compatibility constraints
depend essentially on two factors: the notion of iincentive compatibility ￿the
equilibrium concept ￿and the prior knowledge of the mechanism designer ￿
the set of admissible preferences pro￿le. In this paper, the notion of incen-
tive compatibility that we use is strategy-proofness, because of its simplicity
and robustness. The limited informational and rationality requirement of
strategy-proofness are crucial features of the federal mechanism if the lat-
1See Seabright 1996, CrØmer, Estache and Seabright 1996, Caillaud, Jullien and Picard,
1996, Qian and Weingast 1997, Oates 1999 and 2005 and Epple and Nechyba 2004 among
others.
2For a recent empirical study of informational asymmetries between local and federal
governments, see Azfar 2006.
1ter is meant to be a transparent, simple, rule-based scheme understandable
by all constituents of the federation. Moreover, if the federal mechanism
has to be ￿played￿by locally elected representatives, we show that any non
strategy-proof mechanism will give incentives to voters to appoint local del-
egates whose preferences di⁄er from their own, which will in turn distort the
outcome of the federal mechanism.
Without restrictions on the set of admissible preference pro￿les, strategy-
proof rules are either very rigid or dictatorial (Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite
1975). However, satisfactory strategy-proof mechanisms can exist on well de-
￿ned economic environments, i.e. when the mechanism designer can rule out
ex-ante some preferences. In our case, the federal administration, although
not completely omniscient, typically has some information on the structure
of strategic interactions, depending on whether the problem at hand is the
reduction of cross-border pollution or the coordination of regulatory regimes.
The collective choice problem (i.e., the set of admissible preference pro￿les)
considered in this paper features the usual ingredients of a typical model of
federalism: di⁄erent jurisdictions may have di⁄erent ideal policies but local
policies need to be coordinated because of inter-jurisdictional externalities.
In line with the aforementioned literature on strategy-proofness in restricted
domains, we assume that the federal administration knows the shape of ex-
ternalities but does not know the ideal policy of each jurisdiction. In par-
ticular, the information to be elicited is only one-dimensional, which makes
strategy-proofness less demanding.
In the efederalism literature, centralization is usually modelled as a vot-
ing rule over uniform policies (e.g. a common tax rate, law or level of public
good).3 The corresponding mechanisms are (group) strategy-proof because
induced preferences over uniform policies are typically single-peaked (Moulin
1980) but a one-size-￿ts-all rule may generate preference frustration. A nat-
ural question is whether there exist more ￿ exible strategy-proof mechanisms
which could balance the coordination of local policies and the satisfaction
of local preferences. Our environment leaves room for optimism: the relax-
ation of the policy uniformity constraint increases the number of degrees of
freedom of the mechanism designer while keeping constant the number of
incentive compatibility constraints.
However, our main result is that under some neutrality condition, group
3See e.g. Cremer and Palfrey 1996, Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland
1997, Perotti 2001.
2strategy-proof mechanisms are equivalent to the aforementioned voting rules
on uniform policies. We then investigate whether one can get more ￿ ex-
ible and satisfactory mechanisms by relaxing group strategy-proofness to
strategy-proofness. We do get more ￿ exibility: because of the small dimen-
sionality of the set of parameters unknown to the central planner, there exists
strategy-proof mechanisms which are neutral, anonymous, ￿ exible and sensi-
tive to local preferences. However, we show that non uniform strategy-proof
mechanisms are necessarily ine¢ cient.
In order to assess how ine¢ cient they are, we compare their welfare per-
formance to the welfare achieved under ￿non cooperative decentralization￿ ,
i.e. at the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game where each jurisdiction
controls its local policy. Decentralization is Pareto suboptimal ￿since ex-
ternalities are not internalized ￿and thus leaves room for welfare improving
federal interventions. Nevertheless, we show that decentralization is pre-
ferred to any strategy-proof federal mechanism by some jurisdiction. If the
mechanism is furthermore neutral, then this conclusion holds at any pro￿le
of preferences and decentralization is uniformly socially preferred. The same
conclusion holds if we allow for balanced transfers or if we restrict preferences
to be arbitrarily homogeneous.
The heuristic intuition behind our results is that an e¢ cient and ￿ exible
mechanism gives an incentive to local jurisdictions to over-report their pref-
erences so as to pull the policy vector towards their ideal policy. Hence, to
induce truthful report, the mechanism must be either completely rigid ￿as
in the case of uniform rules ￿or entail excessive policy polarization so as to
choke-o⁄ incentives to over-report preferences.
This paper shows that informational constraints imply a tension between
the ￿ exibility and e¢ ciency of the federal intervention. The ￿rst-best may
be theoretically achievable under permissive notions of implementability to-
gether with fully rational voters and unrestricted transfers. For more ro-
bust notions of incentive compatibility, the slightest amount of incomplete or
unveri￿able information prevents a benevolent federal administration from
striking the optimal balance between policy coordination and local prefer-
ences matching. Hence, this paper provides a game theoretic rationale for
the informal argument that an uninformed central administration may not
do better than a uniform rule.
A few papers have looked at the rigidity of federal policy making and
interjurisdictional mechanisms. Harstad 2007 considers a bargaining game
in which two countries try to internalize spillovers. He shows that a uniform
3level of public good can reduce bargaining costs. Dreze, Le Breton and Weber
2007 analyze how to share the cost of a public good among heterogeneous
residents. They show that to prevent a group of citizen to secede and form
a new jurisdiction, the cost should be equalized among the users. Some
recent papers have taken a more political economy approach to the cost of
centralization by assuming away the benevolence of central administrations
(e.g. Seabright 1996, Lockwood 2002 or Besley and Coate 2003). These
models provide useful insights on the relative merit of centralization versus
decentralization but do not explain its presumed rigidity.4
From a technical point of view, our paper uses a novel approach to charac-
terize strategy-proof mechanisms. Following the Bayesian mechanism design
literature, we use envelope theorems (Milgrom and Segal 2002) to prove the
absolute continuity of the value function ￿without imposing any regularity
condition on the mechanism itself as in Corchon and Rueda Llano 2004. This
allows us to use standard calculus technics which are, to a great extent, inde-
pendent of the ￿ne details of the particular collective choice problem under
consideration. As a result, contrary to most of the literature on strategy-
proofness in small domains (e.g. Border and Jordan 1983), our results holds
for a fairly large class of environments of minimal dimensionality. In partic-
ular, our domains need not contain a particular class of preferences (as in
Schummer 1997 and 1999) nor preferences with arbitrary concavity or degree
of complementarity (as in Zhou1991a and 1991b).5 Finally, we do not restrict
attention to Pareto e¢ cient mechanisms.
Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 characterizes neutral and group
strategy-proof mechanisms and section 4 explores the welfare implications of
strategy-proofness. The sketch of some proofs are provided in the text to
illustrate the ￿rst-order approach, but complete proofs are relegated to an
appendix.
4Indeed, a biased central government, or a minimal winning coalition of regions, should
di⁄erentiate local policies even more than at the social optimum in order to extract max-
imal rents and/or favor their preferred constituency.
5One exception is proposition 1 for more than three jurisdictions, where the proof uses
an arbitrarily ￿rightist￿type for one jurisdiction.
42 The Model
We consider a federation composed of a ￿nite number of local jurisdictions
I = f1::Ng. For all i, xi 2 R denotes the local policy of jurisdiction i and
x￿i the policies of the other members of the federation. Voters are identi￿ed
by their jurisdiction and a one-dimensional type: (i;ti) denotes a resident of
jurisdiction i with type ti. The set of admissible types is an open interval of
R denoted ￿. We assume that in each jurisdiction i, there is a unique local
median type denoted ￿i which we call the type of jurisdiction i.
2.1 The Collective Choice Problem
The preferences, strict preferences and indi⁄erence relation of voter (i;ti) are
denoted respectively ￿i;ti, ￿i;ti and ￿i;ti. They are derived from the following
utility function:
Ui;ti(x) = ￿V (xi ￿ ti) ￿
X
j6=i
Wj(xi ￿ xj): (1)
Assumption 1 The functions V and Wj for all j 2 I are continuous and
quasi-convex, with a unique minimum at 0. V is continuously di⁄erentiable,







The internal e⁄ect of local policies in their respective jurisdiction corre-
sponds to the term V (xi ￿ ti) while Wj(xi ￿ xj) embodies the external cost
imposed by the policy of jurisdiction j on jurisdictions i:6 each jurisdiction
su⁄ers from the lack of homogeneity between its policy and the policies of
its neighbors. The most preferred policy of voter (i;ti) is the uniform policy
(ti;::;ti), hence the type can be viewed as the ideal local policy absent any co-
ordination problems. The externalities generate a tension between the need
for policy coordination and the heterogeneity of preferences: the members
of the federation agree that some degree of harmonization is desirable but
disagree on what the ideal policy should be. Examples of such coordination
6The fact that a given jurisdiction j imposes the same externality Wj (xj ￿ x0) on any
two jurisdictions which have the same policy x0 is immaterial when N = 2. When N > 2,
it is necessary for proposition 1, since otherwise the fairness requirement (see de￿nition
7) has no justi￿cation, and for proposition 4 as well since its proof uses the fact that the
decentralized equilibrium is fair.
5costs include con￿ icting laws, compliance costs imposed by heterogeneous
regulations, inconsistent foreign policies, di⁄erent time zones or incompati-
ble technological standards (see Loeper 2011). Observe that we only require
Wj to be single-peaked and have non zero derivative outside their peak, so
these externalities can either be convex costs or network e⁄ects.
To sharpen our results or clarify the exposition, we will occasionally im-
pose additional assumptions:
De￿nition 1 Externalities are even if for all j, Wj is even.
De￿nition 2 A federation of two jurisdictions has reciprocal preferences if
V is even, twice di⁄erentiable, quasi-convex and for all x 2 R2, W1(x1￿x2) =
W2(x2 ￿ x1).
De￿nition 3 A federation has quadratic preferences if there exists ￿ > 0
such that









2.2.1 Federal Mechanisms and Local Elections
A federal mechanism elicits local information via a game form which maps
pro￿les of messages into policy vectors: ￿ : MN ! RN. In our context, it
is natural to let one delegate per jurisdiction represent the interests of her
constituency at the federal level, rather than have each and every voter in
the federation ￿play￿the federal mechanism. We assume that local represen-
tatives are elected in their respective jurisdiction. Hence, local preferences
are reported through local elections and are aggregated at the federal level
via the mechanism.
We assume that local elections are open, competitive and decided by local
majority rule. We assume furthermore that voters are forward-looking: their
preferences over representatives are derived from their preferences over the
resulting equilibrium policies. More precisely, if tr
i denotes the type of the
representative of jurisdiction i and if the equilibrium outcome of the game
induced by the mechanism ￿ among the representatives is denoted ￿e (tr)
(we will be more concrete on the equilibrium concept later on), we de￿ne the
equilibria of the delegation game as follows:
6De￿nition 4 A delegation equilibrium is a vector of representatives (tr
1;::;tr
N)





is preferred by a majority of resi-




for any ti 2 ￿.
This equilibrium concept is standard in the literature on federalism (e.g.
Persson and Tabelini 1992 or Besley and Coate 2003).7
2.2.2 Incentive Compatibility and Delegation-proofness
Since local representatives are meant to represent the preferences of their
constituency at the federal level, a desirable property of the mechanism is
to ensure that strategic voters will not appoint delegates with preferences
di⁄erent from their own in order to manipulate the outcome of the federal
mechanism. A mechanism ￿ is delegation-proof if
8t 2 R
N;8i 2 I;8si 2 R;￿
e (t) ￿i;ti ￿
e (si;t￿i):
A mechanism ￿ is called direct if its message space MN is the set of pro￿les




i 2 R;￿(t) ￿i;ti ￿(t
0
i;t￿i):
Clearly, a strategy-proof mechanismis delegation-proof and a direct delegation-
proof mechanism is strategy-proof. Moreover, any non direct delegation proof
mechanism ￿ is equivalent to the direct strategy-proof mechanism ￿ de￿ned
by ￿(t) ￿ ￿e (t) for all t 2 ￿N. This paper characterizes delegation-proof
mechanisms. From what precedes, there is no loss of generality in restricting
attention to direct strategy-proof mechanisms.
From our speci￿cation in (1), the conditions of the representative voter
theorem are met within each jurisdiction (Gans and Smart 1996) so the
majority preferences in each jurisdiction i coincide with the preferences of its
median voter (i;￿i). Therefore, under a strategy-proof mechanism, it is always
a delegation equilibrium for all jurisdictions to elect their local median voter
(i.e. tr = ￿) and we shall focus on this equilibrium throughout the paper.8
7The aforementioned papers have a di⁄erent approach in the sense that they analyze
the consequences of strategic delegation on a particular mechanism.
8Since it is a dominant strategy for local majority preferences, this equilibrium selection
hypothesis is not too demanding. If local jurisdiction were considered as single players,
this would be equivalent to restricting attention to truthful implementation rather than
full implementation. See e.g. Dasgupta, Hammond Maskin 1979.
7If the mechanism is strategy-proof, elected representatives have no in-
dividual incentive to misreport their preferences at the federal level, but
jointly pro￿table coalitional deviations may still exist. Group strategies are
hardly avoidable in our federal context. Indeed, federalism is precisely about
bringing the members of the federation to cooperate in order to avoid coor-






jCj;9i 2 C : ￿(￿) ￿i;￿i ￿(￿
0
C;￿￿C):
2.2.3 A Remark on Strategic Delegation
In this subsection, we brie￿ y explain why non strategy-proof mechanisms and
strategic delegation are problematic in our context. If we were to consider
Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms instead, the delegation equilib-
rium would depend on the ￿ne details of the high-order beliefs among voters
and representatives within and across jurisdictions, which would be problem-
atic for practical purposes. As shown in Bergeman and Morris 2005, strategy-
proof mechanisms are the only allocation rules which are implementable for
a su¢ ciently rich set of information structures. Second, even if informa-
tion is known to be complete among voters, the usual integer games and
denouncing methods used in the Nash implementation literature to exploit
the information that participants have on each other are neither satisfactory
nor realistic in our political context.9 On the contrary, the simplicity of di-
rect mechanisms ensures the transparency of the federal intervention. Third,
the delegation equilibrium of a non strategy-proof mechanism will be sen-
sitive to the degree of sophistication of voters, and the mechanism designer
may not know who will vote strategically or truthfully. This compounds the
mechanism design problem since, as we shall see in section 4, the optimal
mechanism under truthful voting may be quite bad under strategic voting
and vice versa. With a strategy-proof mechanism, truthful and strategic vot-
ing coincide and voters need not know anything beyond their own interests.
Finally, we want the incentive compatibility requirement to be consistent
with the usual de￿nition of centralization, which is strategy-proof as we shall
see in subsection 2.2.5.
9See for instance Moore1990 for a review on Nash implementation.
82.2.4 Properties of Federal Mechanisms
To characterize reasonable incentive compatible mechanisms, we will occa-
sionally impose additional normative properties. The latter are important
ingredients of contractual federalism. Indeed, by the very act of designing a
collective mechanism, members of a political federation express their ethical
preferences. Therefore, the normative content of the mechanism can be an
important determinant of its popular support.
De￿nition 5 A mechanism ￿ is e¢ cient if for all distributions of prefer-
ences, no policy is strictly preferred to ￿(￿) by a majority of voters in all
jurisdictions.
As noted above, the majority preferences in each jurisdiction are the
preferences of its median voters, so e¢ ciency is equivalent to Pareto e¢ ciency
among local median voters.
De￿nition 6 A mechanism is neutral if for all ￿ 2 ￿N, u 2 R,
￿(￿ + (u;::;u)) = ￿(￿) + (u;::;u):
In words, a neutral mechanism should be independent of the choice of
origin with which policies and types are labelled.10 The neutrality condition
guarantees that a particular policy, or a political orientation such as liberal
or conservative is not favored ex-ante by the mechanism. It can only be so
on the basis of the preferences reported at the local elections. This property
guarantees that the federal intervention will not be exploited to legitimate
biased outcomes.
De￿nition 7 A mechanism ￿ is fair if for all ￿ 2 ￿N, for all i;j 2 I,
￿i = ￿j implies ￿i (￿) = ￿j (￿).
Fairness means that any two jurisdictions whose representatives have the
same type should have the same policy.11 It can be viewed as some form of
equal treatment of equals.
10As for all i 2 I;u 2 R, x;￿ 2 RN, Ui;￿i(x) = Ui;￿i+u(x + (u;::;u)), our de￿nition of
neutrality is implied by the usual condition of neutrality with respect to the alternatives
which states that the mechanism should depend on ordinal preferences only and not on
the labelling of the alternatives. See e.g. Moulin 1998 for a formal de￿nition.
11It is justi￿ed by the fact that from our speci￿cation in (1), if two jurisdiction have
the same type, conditionally on having the same preferences they have exactly the same
preferences.
92.2.5 Uniform Voting Rules
The public economy literature has focused on unitarian centralization, typ-
ically modelled as a voting rule (usually majority rule) on uniform policies.
To allow di⁄erent jurisdictions and coalitions to carry di⁄erent vote weights,
uniform voting rules are de￿ned as follows:
De￿nition 8 A family of winning coalitions W ￿ 2I is a non empty collec-
tion of coalitions which is
(i) monotonic: C 2 W and C ￿ C0 imply C0 2 W
(ii) proper: if C 2 W, I n C = 2 W
A mechanism is a uniform voting rule if there exists a family of winning
coalitions W such that for any ￿ 2 RN with ￿i1 ￿ :: ￿ ￿iN, if fi1;::;ipg 2 W





Uniformvoting rules are neutral, fair and most importantly group strategy-
proof (Moulin 1980). From a welfare point of view, they remove external ef-
fects and are Pareto e¢ cient since they are locally dictatorial. However, they
are not completely satisfactory for a unique policy may generate preferences
frustration.12 The main goal of this paper is to investigate whether there ex-
ists more ￿ exible mechanisms which satisfy the same incentive compatibility
requirement.
2.3 The Information Structure
Since we restrict our attention to dominant strategy mechanisms, we do not
have to specify what voters and representatives know about each other. We
could either assume that each voter knows only its type, or that local median
types are common knowledge among all voters but cannot be veri￿ed by the
federal administration.
On the contrary, the information of the mechanism designer is a crucial
determinant of the bite of strategy-proofness. Throughout, we assume that
the federal planner knows the functions V and Wj but not the local median
types: the federal administration knows (or can verify) the shape of external
e⁄ects but has to elicit local preferences. Contrary to most of the literature on
12See Loeper 2008a for a more formal statement of the social cost of uniform policies
with coordination externalities.
10strategy-proofness, the asymmetric information has ￿nite dimension, which
simpli￿es the mechanism design exercise.13
The ex-ante knowledge of the mechanism designer can be further re￿ned
by restricting the domain of admissible types. Since the proofs are based on
calculus technics, our results (with the exception of proposition 1 for N ￿ 3)
hold for any type space of the form ￿N for some open interval ￿ of R.
3 Group Strategy-proofness and Uniformity
As argued earlier, uniform voting rules (see de￿nition 8) are robust to coali-
tion manipulations. However, as the next two propositions show, nothing
more ￿ exible can be expected when group strategy-proofness is required.
Proposition 1 A mechanism is neutral, fair and group strategy-proof if and
only if it is a uniform voting rule.
Proof. (Sketch for N = 2, see the appendix for the complete proof) If
￿ is strategy-proof, from the envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal 2002)
Ui;￿i (￿(￿)) is absolute continuous in ￿i. Neutrality implies Ui;￿i (￿(￿)) =
Ui;￿i+u(￿(￿ + (u;u))). Combining the latter two properties with the di⁄eren-
tiability of Ui;￿i (x) in ￿i, we have that Ui;￿i (￿(￿ + h)) is totally di⁄erentiable
in h at h = (0;0) for almost all ￿ 2 ￿2.
Using the Taylor expansion of Ui;￿i (￿(￿ + h)) at h = (0;0), and the fact
that by strategy-proofness
@Ui;￿i(￿(￿+h))
@hi = 0 for i = 1;2, we see that if both
@U1;￿1(￿(￿+h))
@h2 6= 0 and
@U2;￿2(￿(￿+h))
@h1 6= 0, there exists a joint deviation whose
￿rst order e⁄ect is positive for both jurisdictions. Group strategy-proofness
implies then that the gradient of Ui;￿i (￿(￿ + h)) is (0;0) at h = (0;0) for
some i, i.e. i is a local dictator on the range of the mechanism. Using the
continuity of Ui;￿i (￿(￿)), there is a unique local dictator on each side of the
13In this sense, our environment is comparable to the single-peaked domain of Border
and Jordan 1983 in which types are one-dimensional as well. However, in BJ the mecha-
nism can use only one policy to elicit preferences. Heuristically, if we replace the strategy-
proofness constraints by the corresponding ￿rst-order conditions (i.e.
@Ui;￿i(￿(ti;￿￿i))
@ti = 0
at ti = ￿i) both problems reduce to a system of N partial di⁄erential equations. But
our N local policies gives more instruments to the mechanism designer. While BJ has N
degrees of freedom ￿the gradient of N partial derivatives of the single policy ￿while our
setup has N2 degrees of freedom ￿the N ￿ N matrix of partial derivatives of the policy
vector.
11diagonal ￿1 = ￿2, and by fairness, the local dictator i can impose a uniform
policy (￿i;￿i).
The welfare properties of mechanisms which are not neutral, fair or group
strategy-proof are analyzed in the next section. In the remainder of this
section, we discuss the tightness of proposition 1, i.e. whether the relaxation
of its hypotheses allows for non uniform mechanisms.
The term ￿group￿cannot be dropped as will be shown in section 4. How-
ever, the proof uses manipulations by coalitions of at most two groups of
unanimous jurisdictions, i.e. each group having the same type. Hence, it
does not require an unreasonable amount of coordination.
Relaxing fairness allows for non uniform mechanisms. However, the next
proposition shows (in the case of even externalities, see de￿nition 1) that
these mechanisms, on top of being unfair, are still excessively rigid.
Proposition 2 Let ￿ be a neutral and group strategy-proof mechanism in
a federation of two jurisdictions with even externalities, then j￿1 ￿ ￿2j is
constant and for all ￿ 2 ￿2, ￿i (￿) = ￿i for some jurisdiction i.
Hence, the distance between policies is independent of the heterogeneity
of local preferences, and there is always one jurisdiction which is a local
dictator on the range of the mechanism. In particular, if the mechanism
is not uniform, it is not e¢ cient even when preferences are unanimous, i.e.
when types are identical.
4 Individual Strategy-proofness and Federal
Welfare
In this section, we investigate whether strategy-proofness alone leads to more
￿ exible and satisfactory mechanisms. The set of strategy-proof mechanisms
obviously depends on the functions V and W. In any case, as argued in
subsection 2.3 and footnote 12, it may be quite large and should contain non
uniform mechanisms.
For instance, in the case of quadratic preferences (see de￿nition 3), simple




!￿i + (1 ￿ !)￿
￿
i2I with ! =
￿
N ￿ 2 + N
p
1 + 4￿
2(N ￿ 1 + N2￿)
￿
; (2)
12is strategy-proof. Intuitively, ￿SP has the right ￿form￿ : each policy is a
weighted sum of the jurisdictions￿types. For the sake of comparison, the
social choice function ￿￿ which maximizes the sum of utilities of local median
voters has the same expression as (2), but with !￿ = 1=(1 + 2￿). The
mechanism ￿SP balances local preferences matching (through the weight !
each local policy ￿SP
i puts on its respective type ￿i) and policy coordination
(through the weight 1 ￿ ! each policy ￿SP
i puts on the federal mean type
￿). Moreover, the trade-o⁄ between ￿ exibility and coordination is sensitive
to the magnitude of externalities, since ! is decreasing in the magnitude of
externality ￿. Contrary to most of the strategy-proof mechanisms exhibited
in the literature, ￿SP is furthermore neutral, fair, has full range, is nowhere
locally dictatorial nor constant.14 Nevertheless, ￿SP is Pareto ine¢ cient.
The reason is that ￿SP puts too little weight on policy coordination, i.e. !
is too large for ￿SP to be e¢ cient: contrary to uniform voting rules, ￿SP is
too sensitive to local preferences!
The intuition for this ine¢ ciency is that a ￿ exible and e¢ cient mecha-
nism gives incentives to voters to over-report their preferences in order to
pull the policy vector towards their own ideal policy. Consider for instance
a mechanism which implements the policy which mazimizes the sum of util-







. Such a mechanism
would be optimal under sincere voting, i.e. if all jurisdictions were to elect
their local median voters. However ￿￿ is not strategy-proof and hence not
delegation-proof. Simple algebra shows that the representatives elected at the
delegation equilibrium (see de￿nition 4) will be more extreme than the local









. Furthermore, the resulting
equilibrium policy, ￿￿ (tr) =
￿
!r￿i + (1 ￿ !r)￿
￿
i2I with !r =
1+2￿=N
1+2￿=N+￿, is
socially worse than ￿SP (￿): !r > !, so at the delegation equilibrium, the
￿optimal￿mechanism ￿￿ puts even less weight on policy coordination than
the strategy-proof mechanism ￿SP.15 To avoid this race to the extreme, the
14As one can see from de￿nition 3, quadratic preferences have an additive separable form,
but the coordinates used in the decomposition are not the same for each jurisdiction, so
the mechanism is not locally dictatorial component-wise as in Border and Jordan 1983,
Barbera, Sonnenschein and Zhou 1991 or Moulin and Sen 1999.
15This result relates to the argument in subsection 2.2.3 that the optimal mechanism
given truthful voting may be quite bad under strategic voting. Similarly, one can show
in the quadratic case that the optimal utilitarian mechanism given strategic voting is
worse than ￿SP under truthful voting. On the contrary, by de￿nition, a strategy-proof
13mechanism must be either in￿ exible (as uniform voting rules) or be exces-
sively ￿ exible (as ￿SP) so as to choke-o⁄incentives to strategically elect more
extreme delegates.
The next proposition formalizes in the two jurisdictions case the tension
between the ￿ exibility and e¢ ciency of strategy-proof federal mechanisms.16
Proposition 3 A strategy-proof mechanism on a federation of two jurisdic-
tions is e¢ cient (see de￿nition 5) if and only if it is a uniform voting rule.
Proof. (Sketch) If ￿ is e¢ cient, the welfare of jurisdiction 1 at the
equilibrium must be the value of the following utilitarian convex program
P (￿) = max
U2;￿2(x)￿U2;￿2(￿(￿))￿0
U1;￿1 (x).
The maximand of P is constant in ￿2. Strategy-proofness for jurisdiction 2
implies that the derivative of the constraint with respect to ￿2 must be 0 at the
maximum x = ￿(￿). Applying the envelope theorem to P (￿) = U1;￿1 (￿(￿)),
we have
@U1;￿1(￿(￿))
@￿2 = 0 whenever the choice set of P is not a singleton. This
implies that some jurisdiction i is a local dictator at any ￿. Using e¢ ciency,
one can show that this jurisdiction can impose its most preferred policy
(￿i;￿i).
Nevertheless, proposition 3 does not rule out that some nonuniform strategy-
proof mechanisms may be quite satisfactory although not fully e¢ cient. To
gauge more precisely the welfare cost of strategy-proofness, we need a ￿rea-
sonably￿ ine¢ cient social choice function to be used as a benchmark for
welfare comparison. A natural candidate is non-cooperative decentraliza-
tion, i.e. the equilibrium of the game in which each jurisdiction chooses its
policy by local majority rule taking the other policies as given.17 It is generi-
cally Pareto ine¢ cient since the cross-border external e⁄ects (Wj)j2I are not
internalized and can be interpreted as what the jurisdictions could expect
mechanism has the same outcome under truthful and strategic voting.
16The proof, which assumes that utility functions are strictly quasi-concave, is a corollary
of a more general result in Loeper 2008 but is provided for the sake of self-containment.
17A decentralized equilibrium is a policy vector x such that in each jurisdiction i, x is
preferred by a majority of voters to (yi;x￿i) for all yi 2 R. As argued earlier, majority
preferences in all jurisdiction are exactly the preferences of their respective median voter,
so decentralization can be viewed as a Nash equilibrium between local median voters.
14without federal intervention.18
In the sequel, ￿dec refers to the decentralized equilibrium and to guarantee
its uniqueness, we assume that V and W are twice di⁄erentiable and strictly
convex.
Proposition 4 Let ￿ be a strategy-proof mechanism, then for at least all
jurisdictions i but one, there exists a pro￿le of local median types ￿ 2 ￿N
at which (a majority of voters in) jurisdiction i is strictly better-o⁄ under
￿dec (￿) than under ￿(￿).19
Proposition 4 yields a negative result under the sole requirement of strategy-
proofness. It formalizes the trade-o⁄between the incentive compatibility and
the distributional welfare gains of a central intervention. Notice that con-
trary to the common wisdom on the relative advantage of centralization, this
result holds however homogeneous local preferences are, i.e. however small
the set of admissible type ￿ is.
We now turn to the aggregate welfare performance of strategy-proof mech-
anisms using the Benthamite social welfare function among local median
voters B (x) =
P
i Ui;￿i(x).20
Proposition 5 Let ￿ be a strategy-proof, neutral mechanism in a federation
of two jurisdictions with reciprocal preferences (see de￿nition 2), then for all
￿ 2 ￿N, ￿ is Benthamite dominated by ￿dec, strictly so whenever ￿1 6= ￿2.
As an immediate corollary, if ￿ is strategy-proof and neutral, for all distri-
butions of preferences there is a majority of voters in some jurisdiction which
are better-o⁄under decentralization. Notice that the neutrality requirement
18At this point, we should stress that decentralization is described as a complete in-
formation game, which may seem surprising since we haven￿ t speci￿ed the information
structure among voters. However, it is the unique equilibrium of a supermodular game, so
it is a reasonable prediction even if information is only approximately complete (see Kajii
and Morris 1997). Moreover, even if information is not near complete, most tatonement
process would converge to it (Milgrom and Roberts 1990). In any case, to the extent that
decentralization is used as a benchmark for welfare assessment, the information structure
is immaterial.
19It should be clear from the proof of proposition 4 that, at least in the two jurisdictions
case, the set of such pro￿le of types is non negligible, i.e. of positive Lebesgue measure.
20Observe that the Benthamite criterion among local median voters can be strictly
equivalent to the Benthamite criterion for the whole confederation, for instance if V is
even and if types are symmetriclaly distributed in each jurisdiction.
15is indispensable: since decentralization is suboptimal, it can be dominated
by a constant mechanism on a non negligible parameter constellation.
Let us conclude this section on a remark about transfers. To the ex-
tent that they are feasible and free of stigma, the use of unrestricted inter-
jurisdictional monetary transfers would allow more ￿ exible and e¢ cient out-
comes. However, we show in the appendix that if such transfers are restricted
to be balanced, proposition 5 carries over in the usual quasi-linear setting.
Since uniform rules are not e¢ cient in a transferable setup, proposition 3
should be rephrased as follows: there is no e¢ cient and strategy-proof mech-
anism with balanced transfers.
5 Conclusion
This paper takes an informational approach to contractual federalism and
endogenizes the cost of centralization via incentive compatibility constraints.
We show that the later have a bite even if the dimensionality of private
information is minimal. Our model highlights a trade-o⁄between the welfare
performance, the ￿ exibility and the robustness to manipulations of the federal
mechanism.
We ￿rst provide a characterization of uniform voting rules in terms of
group strategy-proofness and neutrality. We then consider individual strategy-
proof (or equivalently delegation-proof) mechanisms and show that the only
such mechanisms which are e¢ cient are uniform. There exists non uniform
strategy-proof mechanisms but they are even worse than non cooperative
decentralization in terms of welfare, even if (balanced) transfers are allowed.
Our results suggest that a ￿ exible federal intervention which could bal-
ance e¢ ciently policy coordination and local preferences satisfaction is hang-
ing upon assumptions which are not innocuous. It may be achievable under
permissive notions of incentive compatibility together with fully rational vot-
ers, unrestricted transfers and no budget constraints. But for robust notions
of implementation, a benevolent but not omniscient central administration
may not do better than a uniform policy. The fact that more centralized
federations are empirically associated with more uniform policies can be in-
terpreted as an evidence of the informational constraints faced by federal
administrations.
166 Proofs in Section 3
Induced preferences over uniform rules are single-peaked. Therefore, from
Moulin 1980, strategy-proof uniform rules must be min-max rules. By neu-
trality, the min-max rules must have no (￿nite) phantom voters. One can
easily show that such min-max rules are equivalent to the uniform voting
rules described in de￿nition 8. Reciprocally all uniform voting rules are neu-
tral, fair and group strategy-proof. Hence, to prove proposition 1, it su¢ ces
to show that the range of a group-strategy-proof, neutral and fair mecha-
nisms is restricted to uniform policies. It will be done successively for two,
three and more than three jurisdictions. In the two jurisdictions case, we
shall prove proposition 2 as well.
6.1 Preliminary Lemmas
Lemma 1 Let ￿ be a strategy-proof mechanism, then for all i 2 I, ￿i (￿) is









0 (￿i (t;￿￿i) ￿ t)dt: (3)
Proof. The monotonicity of ￿i (￿) in ￿i comes from the single crossing
property of Ui in (xi;￿i) and the usual revealed preferences argument. As V
is continuously di⁄erentiable, Ui is absolutely continuous and di⁄erentiable
in ￿i and (3) follows directly from the envelope theorem in Milgrom and Segal
2002 (theorem 2).
Lemma 2 Let ￿ be a strategy-proof, neutral mechanism in a federation of
two jurisdictions, then U￿ (￿(￿)) is continuous in ￿, ￿(￿) has a left and right
limit everywhere in ￿1 and ￿2 and is almost everywhere continuous in ￿. For
i = 1;2, at any continuity point ￿ of ￿i, Ui;￿i (￿(￿)) is totally di⁄erentiable22













0 (￿i (￿) ￿ ￿i):
21See Royden 1988 for a de￿nition of absolute continuity.
22See Royden 1988 for a de￿nition of absolute continuity and total di⁄erentiability.
17Proof. As ￿ is neutral, Ui;￿i (￿(￿)) = Ui;￿i+u (￿(￿ + (u;u))) for i = 1;2.
From lemma 1, Ui;￿i (￿(￿)) is continuous in ￿i. By letting u ! 0, it is
continuous in ￿j.
From lemma 1, ￿i is monotonic. As such, it is continuous almost every-
where in ￿i and has a right and left limit everywhere. Using neutrality,
￿(￿ + ￿) = ￿(￿1 + ￿1 ￿ ￿2;￿2) + (￿2;￿2). Therefore, ￿i is continuous in ￿
whenever it is continuous in ￿i.
Let ￿ be a continuity point of ￿i, say i = 1 for concreteness. Using
successively the neutrality of ￿, lemma 1 and the continuity of V 0 and ￿1 at
￿, we have for all h 2 R2,
U1;￿1+h1 (￿(￿ + h)) ￿ U1;￿1 (￿(￿))





0 (￿1 (t;￿2) ￿ t)dt = (h1 ￿ h2)(V
0 (￿1 (￿) ￿ ￿1)) + o(h).
From (1),




0 (￿1 (￿ + h) ￿ t)dt,
= ￿h1 (V
0 (￿1 (￿) ￿ ￿1)) + o(h).
Summing the equations above, we have
U1;￿1 (￿(￿ + h)) ￿ U1;￿1 (￿(￿)) = ￿h2 (V
0 (￿1 (￿) ￿ ￿1)) + o(h); (4)
which establishes total di⁄erentiability of U1;￿1 (￿(￿ + h)) in h at any conti-
nuity point ￿ of ￿1. The partial derivatives are by de￿nition the coe¢ cients
of h1 and h2 in the linear part of the right hand-side of (4).
De￿nition 9 A mechanism ￿ is unanimity respecting for jurisdictions i and
j if for all ￿ 2 ￿N, ￿i = ￿j implies ￿(￿) = (￿i;::;￿i).
Lemma 3 If ￿ is group strategy-proof and unanimity respecting for for ju-
risdictions i and j, then ￿i ￿ ￿j ) ￿i (￿) ￿ ￿j (￿). If ￿ is strategy-proof,
neutral and fair on a federation of two jurisdictions, it is unanimity respecting
for jurisdiction 1 and 2.
18Proof. Let ￿ 2 ￿N and suppose ￿1 ￿ ￿2 and ￿1 (￿) > ￿2 (￿). If
￿2 (￿) ￿ ￿1, then both jurisdictions strictly prefer the policy (￿1;::;￿1) to
￿(￿). If ￿1 (￿) ￿ ￿2 , then both jurisdiction strictly prefer the policy
(￿2;::;￿2) to ￿(￿). Finally, if ￿1 < ￿2 (￿) and ￿1 (￿) < ￿2, then both juris-
dictions prefer (￿2 (￿);::;￿2 (￿)) to ￿(￿). For all u 2 [￿1;￿2], (u;::;u) 2 ￿N
so the deviations above belongs to the range of ￿, a contradiction to group
strategy-proofness.
To show the second part, let u 2 ￿. As ￿ is fair, ￿(u;u) = (v;v) for
some v. As ￿ is open, (u + ￿;u + ￿) 2 D￿ for ￿ small enough. By neutrality,
￿(u + ￿;u + ￿) = (v + ￿;v + ￿). The later policy should not be preferred by
both jurisdictions for ￿ < 0 and ￿ > 0, which implies u = v.
6.2 Two Jurisdictions
Throughout subsection 6.2, ￿ is a neutral, group strategy-proof mechanism
on a domain ￿2 for some open interval ￿ of R. We shall make it explicit
when we assume furthermore that externalities are even (to prove proposition
2) or that ￿ is fair (to prove proposition 1 for N = 2).
By neutrality, ￿ is completely characterized by the function ￿1 ! ￿(￿1;￿2)
for a given ￿2 2 ￿. Hence, to simplify notations, unless otherwise mentioned,
we will ￿x ￿2, and consider ￿ as a function of ￿1 only.
Claim 1 ￿1 (resp. ￿2) can only have upward (resp. downward) jumps in
￿1.
Proof. From lemma 1, ￿i is non decreasing in ￿i, and by neutrality
￿2 (￿) = ￿2 (0;￿2 ￿ ￿1) + ￿1.
De￿nition 10 For i = 1;2, Di = f￿1 2 ￿ : ￿i (￿1) = ￿ig.
The strategy of the proof is to show that D1 and D2 cover the whole type
space ￿ and that on Di, jurisdiction i is a local dictator on the range of
the mechanism. In the sequel, for any subset A of ￿, Ac;A and Ao denote
respectively its complement, topological closure and interior for the usual
metric topology in ￿.






￿ D1 \ D2.
19Proof. Let ￿ be a continuity point of ￿. Suppose V 0 (￿i (￿) ￿ ￿i) 6= 0
for i = 1;2 and set hi = ￿V 0 (￿j (￿) ￿ ￿j). From equation (4) in lemma
2, reporting ￿ + ￿h is a pro￿table deviation for both jurisdictions at ￿ for ￿












= ￿i for some i. From lemma 2, ￿ is continuous almost everywhere,
so D1 [D2 = ￿. Therefore, D1
c









proves the second point.
Claim 3 For i = 1;2, Di
o




Proof. Let ￿1 2 Di
o
; there exists two sequences sn and tn in Di respec-
tively non decreasing and non increasing which tend to ￿1. From claim 1, ￿i
has either upward or downward jump in ￿1, so by de￿nition of Di, ￿1 2 Di.
Let ￿1 2 D1
o
, there exists ￿ > 0 such that [￿1 ￿ ￿;￿1 + ￿] ￿ D1
o
. From
lemma 1, U1;￿1 (￿(￿)) is absolutely continuous in ￿1 and since D1
o
￿ D1 its
derivative is null on [￿1 ￿ ￿;￿1 + ￿]. Therefore it is constant on this interval.
If ￿1 2 D2
o
, from lemma 2, @
@￿1U2;￿2 (￿(￿)) = 0 and the same reasoning
applies.

























= ￿j for some i;j. Moreover, if
￿1 2 D1 \ D2, this must be true for some i 6= j.













= ￿j follow from D1 [ D2 = ￿ (claim 2).
Suppose the second part of the claim is not true. This implies that there












6= ￿i for some i, say 2. This implies
that there exists ￿ > 0 such that ]￿1 ￿ ￿;￿1[\D2 = ; and ]￿1;￿1 + ￿[\D2 = ;.
Since ￿1 2 D2, it must be that ￿1 2 D2. From claim 2, D1 is dense in
]￿1 ￿ ￿;￿1 + ￿[. From claim 1, ]￿1 ￿ ￿;￿1 + ￿[ is included in D1, and so in
D1
o
. From claim 3, U1;￿1 (￿(t1;￿2)) is constant for t1 2 ]￿1 ￿ ￿;￿1 + ￿[ and
￿1 (t1;￿2) = t1. From assumption 1, given x1 = ￿1, U1;￿1 (x) is strictly quasi-
concave in x1 ￿ x2. Hence, on ]￿1 ￿ ￿;￿1 + ￿[, ￿1 ￿ ￿2 can take at most two
values. From claim 1, ￿1 ￿￿2 can only have upward jumps in ￿1, so it must
be continuous to the right or to the left. As ￿1 2 D1
o
, ￿1 is continuous at













= ￿2, a contradiction.





, ￿1￿￿2 is locally constant in ￿1 if ￿1 2 D1\D2, ￿ is continuous
in ￿1 and ￿(￿) = ￿.
Proof. Suppose to ￿x ideas that ￿1 < ￿2. If ￿1 2 Di
o
for some i, then from
claim 3, Ui;￿i (￿(￿)) is constant and V (￿i (￿) ￿ ￿i) = 0 on a neighborhood N
of ￿1. So for Ui;￿i (￿(￿)) to be constant, it must be the case that Wj (￿i ￿ ￿j)
is constant. Under assumption 1, it means that ￿i ￿ ￿j can take only two
values of opposite sign on N. If ￿ is fair, from lemma 3, it can take only
one value on N since ￿1 < ￿2. If externalities are even, j￿i ￿ ￿jj must be
constant on N. From lemma 2, Uj;￿j (￿(￿)) is continuous, so ￿j (￿)￿￿j must
be continuous. Since ￿1 < ￿2, this implies that ￿i￿￿j cannot discontinuously
change sign and is therefore constant on N as well.








































. From lemma 2,


































































Equations (5) and (6) are incompatible if externalities are even (Wi (:) can



















= ￿i and ￿i is continuous at ￿1. If ￿ is fair, from lemma 2, Ui (￿)
is continuous and from lemma 3, ￿1 ￿ ￿2 cannot change sign, so ￿j must




= ￿j. If externalities are even, the continuity
of Ui (￿) and ￿i implies that j￿i ￿ ￿jj is continuous, and the continuity of
Uj (￿) implies that ￿j must be continuous as well and ￿(￿) = ￿.
Claim 6 D1 \ D2 has no accumulation point ￿1 6= ￿2.
21Proof. Let ￿1 be an accumulation point of D1 \ D2, then ￿1 2 D1 \ D2.













, which from assumption 1 is non zero whenever
￿1 6= ￿2. From claim 5, ￿ is continuous at ￿1 and from lemma 1,
@[U1;￿1(￿)]
@￿1 =
V 0 (￿1 (￿) ￿ ￿1) = 0, a contradiction.





cover the whole domain ￿. So claim 5 shows that on each side of the diagonal,
￿1 ￿ ￿2 is locally constant except possibly on D1 \ D2 where ￿ must be
continuous. From claim 6, D1 \ D2 has only isolated points outside the
diagonal. By continuity ￿1￿￿2 must be constant on each side of the diagonal.
From lemma 2, the value function is continuous. So if ￿ is fair, ￿1 = ￿2 on
the diagonal, and thus everywhere. If externalities are even, j￿1 ￿ ￿2j must
be continuous on the diagonal, and hence constant on ￿2.
6.3 Coalitions of Unanimous Jurisdictions
For any partition ￿ = (C1;::;CP) of the original federation I, we de￿ne the
reduced federation I￿ = f1;::;Pg. Given a group strategy-proof, neutral
and fair mechanism ￿ on I, we shall construct a mechanism ￿￿ on I￿ which
inherits the properties of ￿. Let ￿￿ : RP ! RN be de￿ned by:
8￿ 2 R
P;8k 2 I￿;i 2 Ck ) ￿
￿
i (￿) = ￿k:
If the preferences of the members of the federation I are given by the functions
V and W as in (1), the preferences of jurisdictions k 2 I￿ with type ￿k are
de￿ned by:
8x 2 R












For any pro￿le of type ￿ 2 RP of the reduced federation, ￿￿ (￿) is a pro￿le
of type of the original federation I such that types are identical within each




prescribes the same policy to any
two members of the same coalition in ￿. Therefore we can de￿ne ￿￿ as
￿￿ =
￿
￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿. It is immediate to see that ￿￿ inherits the properties
of group strategy-proofness, neutrality and fairness of ￿.
22De￿nition 11 A coalition C ￿ I is a right (resp. left) winning coalition for
￿ if whenever ￿C = (a;::;a) and ￿InC = (b;::;b) for some a > b (resp. a < b)
then ￿(￿) = (a;::;a).
Lemma 4 For all C ￿ I, either C is left (resp. right) winning or I r C is
right (resp. left) winning and I is always right and left winning.
Proof. Consider the partition ￿ = (C;InC). Let I￿ and ￿￿ be the
corresponding reduced federation and mechanism. From what precedes, ￿￿
is neutral, fair and group strategy-proof. As there are only two coalitions,
we know from subsection 6.2 that ￿￿ is a uniform voting rule. In the case
of two jurisdictions, there are only four such voting rules, the min, the max
and the two dictatorship, which all have a unique dictator on each side of
the diagonal.
6.4 Three Jurisdictions
Let ￿ be a fair, neutral, group strategy-proof mechanism in a federation of
three jurisdictions on a domain R3. We assume w.l.o.g. ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿3. We
consider two cases: either f1g or f3g are respectively left and right winning,
and both f1;2g and f2;3g are respectively left and right winning coalitions
(see de￿nition 11). By lemma 4, the two cases cover all possibilities.
Claim 7 If there is at least two identical types, then:
￿(￿) = (￿1;￿1;￿1) if f1g is a left winning coalition,
￿(￿) = (￿3;￿3;￿3) if f3g is a right winning coalition,
￿(￿) = (￿2;￿2;￿2) if f1;2g and f2;3g are respectively left and right winning
coalitions.
Proof. If there is at least two identical types, there is at most two
di⁄erent types and lemma 4 applies.
Claim 8 If ￿1 < ￿2 < ￿3 and if f1g (resp.f3g) is a left (resp. right) winning
coalition then ￿(￿) = (￿1;￿1;￿1) (resp. (￿3;￿3;￿3)).
Proof. Consider the case where f1g is a left winning coalition, the other
case is identical. From claim 7, jurisdiction 2 can get the policy (￿1;￿1;￿1)
by reporting ￿1, so ￿(￿) ￿2;￿2 (￿1;￿1;￿1), which implies ￿2 (￿) ￿ ￿1. For the
same reason, ￿3 (￿) ￿ ￿1.
23If only one of the latter two inequalities is strict, say ￿3 (￿) > ￿2 (￿) =
￿1, then (￿1;￿1;￿1) ￿2;￿2 ￿(￿), which contradicts strategy-proofness. If
￿2 (￿) > ￿1 and ￿3 (￿) > ￿1, then for i = 2;3, as ￿(￿) ￿i;￿i (￿1;￿1;￿1)
and as ￿i satis￿es the strict single-crossing condition in (￿i;xi), ￿(￿) ￿i;￿3+1
(￿1;￿1;￿1). It is a contradiction to group strategy-proofness since from claim
7, ￿(￿1;￿3 + 1;￿3 + 1) = (￿1;￿1;￿1). Finally, we must have ￿2 (￿) = ￿3 (￿) =
￿1 and strategy-proofness for jurisdiction 2 implies ￿1 (￿) = ￿1 as well.
Let us now assume for the rest of the subsection that both f1;2g and
f2;3g are respectively left and right winning coalitions. To prove ￿(￿) =
(￿2;￿2;￿2), the strategy is to let ￿3 ! +1, in other words to consider the
case where jurisdiction 3 has purely ￿ideological￿preferences: it cares only
about having a policy as far as possible to the right. We shall show that this
extreme type induces a mechanism for jurisdiction 1 and 2 which is group
strategy-proof, neutral and fair (claim 9 to 13).23 We shall then show that it
must be uniform using a reasoning similar to the two jurisdiction case (claim
14 to 16). We ￿rst de￿ne the correspondence of the accumulation points of










￿(￿1;￿2;￿3) : ￿3 ￿ ￿3
￿
:
Claim 9 The correspondence A is non empty and neutral, i.e.:
8u 2 R, A(￿1 + u;￿2 + u) = A(￿1;￿2) + (u;u;u).
Proof. From claim 7, jurisdiction 1 can secure the policy (￿2;￿2;￿2)
by reporting ￿2. Therefore, strategy-proofness implies that ￿(￿1;￿2;￿3) is
bounded in ￿3 for ￿3 ￿ ￿2. From Bolzano-Weierstrass, A(￿1;￿2) is non
empty. The neutrality of A follows from the neutrality of ￿.







23We cannot simply ￿x the type of jurisdiction 3 to a ￿nite value since the resulting
mechanism for jurisdiction 1 and 2 would not be neutral.
24Proof. From lemma 1, ￿3 (￿1;￿2;￿3) is non decreasing in ￿3. To show
that U3;￿3(￿(￿1;￿2;￿3)) is non increasing for ￿3 ￿ ￿2, let ￿
0
3 > ￿3 > ￿3.
By strategy-proofness, ￿(￿1;￿2;￿3) ￿3;￿3 ￿(￿1;￿2;￿
0
3) and from lemma 1,
￿3 (￿1;￿2;￿3) ￿ ￿3 (￿1;￿2;￿
0
3). As ￿3 satis￿es the single-crossing condition
in (￿3;x3), ￿(￿1;￿2;￿3) ￿3;￿3 ￿(￿1;￿2;￿
0
3). As argued in the proof of claim
9, ￿(￿1;￿2;￿3) is bounded in ￿3, so by monotonicity the two limits exist.
Claim 11 Let ￿1;t1;￿2 2 R, if for all increasing sequence ￿
n
3 ! 1 and
tn





then lim￿3!1 U1;￿1(￿1;￿2;￿3) exists. The same claim holds by switching the
role of 1 and 2.
Proof. Under the hypotheses of the claim, group strategy-proofness for
jurisdictions (3;tn






As it is true for any sequences ￿
n
3 and tn
3, letting n ! 1 in (7), the continuity
of U1 (x) implies
x 2 A(￿1;￿2);y 2 A(t1;￿2) ) x ￿1;￿1 y: (8)
By strategy-proofness, for all ￿3, ￿(￿1;￿2;￿3) ￿1;￿1 ￿(t1;￿2;￿3). Letting
￿3 ! 1,
8x 2 A(￿1;￿2);9y 2 A(t1;￿2) : x ￿1;￿1 y: (9)
From (8) and (9), U1;￿1 (A(￿1;￿2)) must be a singleton.




Proof. Let (￿1;￿2) be such that (￿2;￿2;￿2) = 2 A(￿1;￿2). Let ￿
n
3 ! 1 be





From (1), (10), (￿2;￿2;￿2) = 2 A(￿1;￿2) and ￿
n




3) > ￿2. So, by the strict single-crossing condition, for all
sequence tn







3 (￿2;￿2;￿2) = ￿(￿1;￿2;t
n
3): (11)
25where the last equality comes from claim 7. Claim 11 and (11) implies that
lim￿3!1 U1;￿1(￿1;￿2;￿3) exists.24
Since ￿1 ￿ ￿2 < tn
3, (￿2;￿2;￿2) ￿3;tn





3), which together with claim 11 proves that lim￿3!1 U2;￿2(￿1;￿2;￿3)
exists.
If (￿2;￿2;￿2) 2 A(￿1;￿2), from claim 10, for all x 2 A(￿1;￿2), x3 = ￿2
and as U3;￿3(x) = U3;￿3 (￿2;￿2;￿2) for all ￿3, one can easily see from (1) that
necessarily x = (￿2;￿2;￿2).
Claim 13 Let ￿1 be a selection25 of A which is neutral, then ￿1 is a group
strategy-proof mechanism and ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ) ￿1
1 (￿) ￿ ￿1
2 (￿) ￿ ￿1
3 (￿).
Proof. Let ￿1 (￿1;￿2) be a neutral selection from A(￿1;￿2) (such a
selection exists from claim 9). Let ￿1;￿2;t1;t2 2 R, and let tn
3 ! 1 be such
that lim￿(t1;t2;tn
3) ! ￿1 (t1;t2). Group strategy-proofness for ￿ implies
Ui;￿i (￿(￿1;￿2;t
n
3)) ￿ Ui;￿i (￿(t1;t2;t
n
3))
for i = 1 or 2. Letting n ! 1, from claim 12 and the continuity of Ui (x)
we get
Ui;￿i (￿
1 (￿1;￿2)) ￿ Ui;￿i (￿
1 (t1;t2))
for i = 1 or 2, which establishes group strategy-proofness for ￿1. Individual
strategy-proofness can be established similarly.
From claim 7 and lemma 3, ￿1 (￿) ￿ ￿2 (￿) ￿ ￿3 (￿) for all ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿3.
Letting ￿3 ! 1 completes the proof.
The strategy for the reminder of the proof is to consider ￿1 (￿1;￿2) as a
mechanism for jurisdiction 1 and 2 only and adapt the proof in subsection
6.2. From (1), Ui;￿i (x) is additively separable in x3 and ￿i for i = 1;2. Hence,
lemma 1 and its proof hold unchanged for Ui;￿i (￿1). From claim 13, ￿1 is
neutral so Ui;￿i+u (￿1 (￿1 + u;￿2 + u)) is constant in u, and lemma 2 and its
proof hold unchanged as well.
Having this in mind, claims 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold for ￿1 since their proofs
are based solely on lemmas 1 and 2.
24Clearly, claim 11 still holds if the sequences ￿
n
3 and tn
3 are required to be bounded




25A selection s of a correspondence C with domain DC is a function such that for all
x 2 DC, f (x) 2 C (x).
26Claims 5 cannot be proven as in the two jurisdictions case: the additional
term W3 (￿1
i ￿ ￿1
3 ) in the utility of jurisdictions 1 and 2 gives more instru-
ments to the mechanism designer to satisfy incentive compatibility. However,
we shall show that group strategy-proofness implies that ￿1
3 ￿￿1
2 is increas-
ing in ￿1, which implies that it is null since ￿1
3 ￿ ￿1
2 for all ￿1 < ￿2 and
￿1
3 = ￿1
2 when ￿1 = ￿2.
As in the two jurisdiction case, in the sequel we ￿x ￿2, consider ￿1 as a
function of ￿1 only and assume ￿1 < ￿2.






2 is locally non decreasing in ￿1.
Proof. From claim 13, ￿1
1 ￿ ￿1
2 ￿ ￿1
3 . If ￿1 2 D1
o
from claim
3, there is a neighborhood N of ￿1 such that on N, U1;￿1 (￿1 (￿1;￿2)) and
V (￿1
1 (￿1;￿2) ￿ ￿1) are constant in ￿1 on N. From claim 1, ￿1
1 ￿￿1
2 is non
decreasing in ￿1 and non positive on N, so W2 (￿1
1 ￿ ￿1
2 ) is non increasing
in ￿1. Therefore, W3 (￿1
1 ￿ ￿1
3 ) must be non decreasing. Since ￿1
1 ￿ ￿1
3
this implies that ￿1
1 ￿￿1
3 is non increasing, and thus ￿1
3 ￿￿1
2 must be non
decreasing.
If ￿1 2 D2
o
, a similar reasoning shows that on a neighborhood N of ￿1,
U2;￿2 (￿1) and V (￿1
2 ￿ ￿2) are locally constant and W1 (￿1
2 ￿ ￿1
1 ) is non
increasing, so W3 (￿1
2 ￿ ￿1
3 ) and thus ￿1
3 ￿￿1
2 must be non decreasing.






> f (￿1) for ￿9￿ >
0 : 8t1 2 ]￿1;￿1 + ￿[, f (t1) > f (￿1).￿We shall say that f has an upward
jump (to the right of ￿1) if 9￿;￿ > 0 : 8t1 2 ]￿1;￿1 + ￿[, f (t1) > f (￿1) + ￿.






< f (￿1) are de￿ned similarly.










2 )(￿1) or ￿1 is continuous
and ￿1
1;2 (￿1;￿2) = (￿1;￿2).
Proof. Observe ￿rst that to obtain the ￿rst conclusion of the claim, it
su¢ ces to show that W3 (￿1
2 ￿ ￿1
3 ) or W3 (￿1
1 ￿ ￿1
3 ) has an upward jump.
Indeed, from claim 13, ￿1
2 ￿ ￿1
3 so from assumption 1, if W3 (￿1
2 ￿ ￿1
3 )













1 is decreasing so the same conclusion holds if W3 (￿1
1 ￿ ￿1
3 )
has an upward jump.
Suppose ￿rst that ￿1
2 ￿￿1
1 is discontinuous to the right of ￿1. By claim 1,
￿1
2 ￿￿1
1 can only have downward jumps. Since ￿1
1 ￿ ￿1
2 , from assumption
1, W1 (￿1
2 ￿ ￿1







= ￿2, V (￿1
2 ￿ ￿2) is
27either continuous at ￿1 or has a downward jump. From lemma 2, U2;￿2 (￿1) is
continuous, so W3 (￿1
2 ￿ ￿1















= ￿1 and a similar reasoning for jurisdiction 1 shows
that for U2;￿2 (￿1) to be continuous, it must be that W3 (￿1
1 ￿ ￿1




2 are continuous to the right of ￿1, the continuity of
U (￿1) implies the continuity of ￿1






6= ￿i for some i, then by
continuity, ]￿1;￿1 +￿[\Dj = ; for some ￿ > 0. So from claim 2, ]￿1;￿1 +￿[ is
included in Dj and so in Dj
o
and from claim 14, ￿1
3 ￿￿1
2 is non decreasing

















= (￿1;￿2), by continuity
the other conclusion follows.
The only case left is ￿1
2 ￿ ￿1
1 continuous but ￿1
1 (and hence ￿1
2 ) dis-







= ￿i for some i, say
i = 2, the other case is identical. V (￿1
2 ￿ ￿2) has a downward jump in ￿1
and W1 (￿1
2 ￿ ￿1
1 ) is continuous by hypothesis. From lemma 2, U2;￿2 (￿1)
is continuous so W3 (￿1
2 ￿ ￿1
3 ) must have an upward jump in ￿1.
Claim 16 ￿1
3 ￿ ￿1
2 is non decreasing in ￿1.
Proof. Let us denote









We shall show that D(￿1) ￿ 0 for all ￿1 < ￿2, which implies the claim (see
e.g. Royden 1988 p. 99).











and Sc the set of types at which ￿1 is continuous and ￿1
1;2 (￿1;￿2) = (￿1;￿2).
From claim 2, S+ and Sc cover all possible situations. By de￿nition, ￿1 2
S+ ) D(￿1) ￿ 0. If ￿1 2 Sc and ]￿1;￿1 + ￿[ ￿ S+ for some ￿ > 0, ￿1
3 ￿ ￿1
2
must be non decreasing on ]￿1;￿1 + ￿[ so by continuity D(￿1) ￿ 0.
The only case left is ￿1 2 Sc and there is a decreasing sequence ￿
n
1 in Sc
which converges to ￿1. From claim 15, ￿1 (￿) = (￿1;￿2;￿1
3 (￿)). Strategy-
proofness for jurisdiction 3 and claim 7 implies ￿1
3 (￿) > ￿2. Moreover,
￿1 < ￿2 so assumption 1 implies that at x = ￿1 (￿), for i = 1;2,
lim inf
y1!x1





















1 > ￿1, from what precedes ￿1
1;2 (￿
n
1;￿2) is strictly preferred by jurisdictions









3 (￿1;￿2) for n
su¢ ciently large, so D(￿1) ￿ 0.
Claim 17 If ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿3 and f1;2g and f2;3g are respectively left and
right winning coalitions, ￿(￿) = (￿2;￿2;￿2).
Proof. From claim 13, ￿1
2 = ￿1
3 at ￿1 = ￿2, so claim 16 implies ￿1
2 =
￿1
3 for all ￿1 ￿ ￿2. Under our speci￿cation, given x2 = x3, the preferences
of jurisdiction 1 and 2 over (x1;x2) have exactly the same form as in the
standard 2 jurisdictions case. Hence, from subsection 6.2, ￿1 is uniform.
Since the policy (￿2;￿2;￿2) can be secured both by coalitions f1;2g and
f2;3g and since this policy is strictly preferred to any other uniform policy by
either coalition, ￿1 (￿1;￿2) = (￿2;￿2;￿2). Since ￿1 is any neutral selection
from A, A(￿1;￿2) = f(￿2;￿2;￿2)g for all ￿1 ￿ ￿2.
By monotonicity of ￿3 in ￿3, ￿3 (￿) ￿ ￿1
3 (￿1;￿2) = ￿2 for all ￿1 ￿
￿2 ￿ ￿3. Since jurisdiction (3;￿3) strictly prefers (￿2;￿2;￿2) to any other
policy such that ￿3 (￿) ￿ ￿2, strategy-proofness and claim 7 implies ￿(￿) =
(￿2;￿2;￿2).
6.5 More than Three Jurisdictions
Let ￿ a neutral, fair and group strategy-proof mechanism on a federation of
N jurisdictions.
De￿nition 12 A jurisdiction i 2 I is pivotal for ￿ if f1;::;ig and fi;::;Ng
are respectively left and right winning coalitions.
Claim 18 There exists p 2 I such that p is pivotal for ￿ at ￿.
Proof. Let p be the smallest integer such that f1;::;pg is left winning.
Such a p exists since by lemma 4, f1;::;Ng is left winning. By construction,
f1;::;p ￿ 1g is not left winning. Using lemma 4 again, fp;::;Ng is right
winning, and p is pivotal.
Let ￿ 2 RN and suppose w.l.o.g. ￿1 ￿ :: ￿ ￿N. Let p 2 I such that p is
pivotal.
29Claim 19 ￿(￿) = (￿p;:::;￿p).
Proof. Consider the following sequence of pro￿les of type: ￿
o = ￿; and
for all n ￿ 0; if ￿(￿


















n is stationary after a ￿nite number of step. Let ￿ denotes its limit,
and let C (resp. C, resp. C) denotes the set of jurisdiction i such that
￿i < ￿p (resp. ￿i = ￿p, resp. ￿i > ￿p). By construction, ￿(￿) = (￿p;:::;￿p)
i.f.f. ￿(￿) = (￿p;:::;￿p).
The collection of coalitions ￿ = (C;C;C) de￿nes a reduced federation of
three jurisdiction as explained in subsection 6.3, and ￿ induces a mechanism
￿￿ on I￿ = f1;2;3g which is group strategy-proof, neutral and fair. By
construction, p 2 C so by de￿nition of p, C [ C and C [ C are respectively
left and right winning coalitions in I, and so do f1;2g and f2;3g in I￿. From
claim 17, ￿￿ (a;￿p;b) = (￿p;￿p;￿p) for any a ￿ ￿p ￿ b. By de￿nition of ￿￿,
for all t such that 8i 2 C, ti = a, 8i 2 C, ti = ￿p, and 8i 2 C, ti = b, we
have ￿(t) = (￿p;::;￿p).
Suppose ￿(￿) 6= (￿p;:::;￿p). By construction of ￿
n, 8i 2 C[C, ￿(￿p;￿￿i) =
(￿p;:::;￿p). Strategy-proofness implies that 8i 2 C, ￿(￿) ￿i;￿i (￿p;:::;￿p) and
since ￿(￿) 6= (￿p;:::;￿p) and a < ￿p; ￿i (￿) < ￿p. The strict single crossing
condition in (￿i;xi) implies that ￿(￿) ￿i;a (￿p;::;￿p) for any a < ￿i. Simi-
larly, for i 2 C; ￿(￿) ￿i;b (￿p;::;￿p) for any b > ￿i. This implies that at t, the
jurisdictions from C and C can strictly bene￿t by reporting their respective
type in ￿ instead of a and b, a contradiction.
7 Proofs in Section 4
The next lemma derives some properties of the non cooperative decentral-
ized equilibrium. As a reminder, for the proof of the following lemma and
propositions 4 and 5 we assume that V and W are twice di⁄erentiable and
strictly convex.
Lemma 5 For all pro￿le of type ￿
(i) there is a unique decentralized equilibrium ￿dec (￿).
(ii) ￿dec is di⁄erentiable almost everywhere in ￿i for all i 2 I.
(iii) ￿dec is increasing in ￿
(iv) ￿i < ￿j ) ￿dec
i (￿) < ￿dec
j (￿)
30(v) for all J ￿ I, if ￿J is uniform, xJ = ￿dec
J (￿) is the unique most-preferred
response to xInJ = ￿dec
InJ (￿) for any jurisdiction j 2 J.
Proof. Since Wj is convex for all j, the game is supermodular which
proves existence (see Milgrom and Roberts 1990 and Vives 1990). Uniqueness






has a diagonally dominant
di⁄erential (see Rosen 1965). Since Ui;￿i has increasing di⁄erences in (xi;￿i)
and the game is supermodular, we know that ￿dec is non-decreasing in ￿.
To show that it is increasing, observe that in equilibrium, each jurisdiction i
minimizes










The strict convexity of V and W implies that (12) has increasing marginal





for all j 6= i (see Edlin and Shannon 1998).






￿i (￿) is non
decreasing in ￿i, ￿dec
i (￿) must be increasing in ￿i. This implies in turn that
￿dec
j (￿) must be increasing in ￿i which proves (iii). Moreover, as (12) depends
on i only through the type ￿i, point (iv) follows.
If ￿J is uniform for some J ￿ I, given ￿dec
InJ (￿) the jurisdictions in J have












is the equilibrium which implies point (v).
7.1 Proof of proposition 3
Since ￿ is e¢ cient (i.e. Pareto e¢ cient among local median voters), a dis-
continuity of ￿ in ￿i corresponds to a jump of Ui;￿i (￿(￿)) in ￿i, which is
incompatible with strategy-proofness.26 Since ￿ is continuous in ￿i, from as-
sumption 1, V 0 (￿i (￿) ￿ ￿i) is continuous in ￿i and from lemma 1, Ui;￿i (￿(￿))
is continuously di⁄erentiable in ￿i.
26Suppose ￿
n
1 ! ￿1 and ￿(￿
n
1;￿2) ! l 6= ￿(￿1;￿2). By continuity of U1;￿1 (￿(￿1;￿2))
and U1;￿1 (x) in ￿i, U1;￿1 (￿(￿1;￿2)) = U1;￿1 (l). By e¢ ciency, U2;￿2 (￿(￿1;￿2)) = U2;￿2 (l).
By strict quasi-concavity, there exists a policy x inbetween ￿(￿1;￿2) and l which is strictly
preferred by both jurisdictions, a contradiction.
31Suppose ￿(￿) 6= (￿2;￿2). Since ￿(￿) is e¢ cient, it solves the following
program:
P (￿) = max
x : U2;￿2(x)￿U2;￿2(￿(￿))￿0
U1;￿1 (x). (13)
By hypothesis, Ui;￿i (x) is quasi-concave and continuous in x. The maximand
of P is constant in ￿2. From what precedes, the constraint is di⁄erentiable in
￿2 and its derivative V 0 (x2 ￿ ￿2) ￿ V 0 (￿2 (￿) ￿ ￿2) is continuous in (￿2;x).
Moreover, since ￿(￿) 6= (￿2;￿2), the choice set has a non empty interior.
Therefore, the conditions of theorem 5 in Milgrom and Segal 2002 are met












for some ￿ ￿ 0. From lemma 1, the right hand-side of (14) is null for almost
all ￿2 so by absolute continuity, P is constant in ￿2.
Let O be an open subset of ￿2 such that ￿(￿) = 2 f(￿1;￿1);(￿2;￿2)g for
all ￿ 2 O. From what precedes, for all i 6= j Ui;￿i (x) is constant in ￿j so
its derivative V 0 (￿i (￿) ￿ ￿i) must be constant in ￿j as well. Since V 0 is
one to one, the mechanism can be decomposed as ￿(￿) = (￿1 (￿1);￿2 (￿2)).
However, one can easily check that such a mechanism cannot be e¢ cient
since the externalities are not internalized. Therefore, the set of points where
￿(￿) = (￿i;￿i) is dense in ￿2. As noted above, ￿(￿) and hence Ui;￿i (￿(￿))
must be continuous in ￿, and there must be a dictator at any point of ￿2.
Finally, since preferences over uniform policies are single-peaked, from Moulin
1980, ￿ must be a uniform voting rule.
7.2 Proof of proposition 4
It su¢ ces to show that ￿dec is preferred by the local median voter (i;￿i)
of all but one jurisdiction. Let u 2 ￿. As ￿dec (u;:::;u) = (u;:::;u) is
unanimously the best policy at the pro￿le of types (u;:::;u), for any i 2 I,
￿(u;:::;u) ￿i;￿i ￿dec (u;:::;u). Let ￿ 2 ￿N be such that ￿￿i = (u;::;u) and
￿i 6= u for some i 2 I. If jurisdiction i is strictly better-o⁄ at ￿ under ￿dec
27Observe that concavity assumption in the theorem 5 of Milgrom and Segal 2002 is
not necessary: from the min-max theorem, quasi-concavity is enough to guarantee the
existence of a saddle point of the Lagrangean, which is the only role of the concavity
assumption.
32than under ￿ and such a type ￿ exists for all i, the proposition follows. If
not, ￿(￿) ￿i;￿i ￿dec (￿) for some i and some ￿ 2 ￿N such that ￿￿i = (u;::;u)
and ￿i 6= u. From what precedes,















































where the argument of ￿dec in the integrand is (t;￿￿i). If we combine (15),

























dt ￿ 0; (17)




a.e. and for all t > u, ￿dec
i (t;￿￿i) > ￿dec
j (t;￿￿i). Hence, the sum in the
integrand in (17) is positive a.e. Therefore, for (17) to hold, it must be that
V 0 (￿i (t;￿￿i) ￿ t) > V 0 ￿
￿dec
i (t;￿￿i) ￿ t
￿
, i.e. ￿i (t;￿￿i) > ￿dec
i (t;￿￿i) for a
set of type t of positive Lebesgue measure.
As ￿￿i = (u;:::;u), from lemma 5 (v), for all j 6= i,
￿
dec








From what precedes, u < ￿dec
i (t;￿￿i) < ￿i (t;￿￿i): ￿dec
i is closer to the ideal













Therefore, if ￿i (t;￿￿i) > ￿dec
i (t;￿￿i), whatever ￿￿i (t;￿￿i), all jurisdictions
j 6= i prefer ￿dec to ￿. A symmetric reasoning yields the same result if ￿i < u.
337.3 Proof of proposition 5




for all ￿ 2 ￿N. Throughout the proof, we assume ￿1 > ￿2 and we omit ￿ un-
less confusion is possible. Since preferences are reciprocal, W1 (x) = W2 (￿x)
for all x and W refers to W2. Combing the F.O.C. of the decentralized




0 (￿1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ V
































From lemma 5 (iv), ￿dec
1 > ￿dec
2 . As ￿dec is increasing in ￿ and as W is
strictly convex with a maximum in 0, (19) is negative. Therefore, for @￿B
@￿1 to
be non negative, it must be that the right hand-side of (18) is positive. We
shall show that this implies that ￿B is negative.





0 (x1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ V
0 (x2 ￿ ￿2) ￿ C (21)








. We shall show that





1 ￿ ￿1) = ￿V
0 (x
￿





2) < 0: (22)


















2 ) < 0: (23)
The ￿rst equality of (22) and (23) together with the evenness of V implies




2 both for x = x￿ and x = ￿dec.





which in turns implies that jV 0 (x￿
i ￿ ￿i)j >
￿ ￿V 0 ￿
￿dec
i ￿ ￿i
￿￿ ￿ for i = 1;2. This
shows that x￿ does not satisfy (21).
28For any v 2 R2 we denote ￿v = v1 ￿ v2. From what precedes, ￿x￿ and ￿￿dec









2(￿x) are increasing in ￿x and are respectively negative and positive,
it must be the case that the solution ￿x(￿) is deceasing in ￿.
34Since the maximand in (20) is strictly concave, from what precedes, the
constraint (21) must be binding. Denoting ￿ its multiplier, the necessary
￿rst order conditions yields
￿V
0 (x1 ￿ ￿1) + ￿V
00 (x1 ￿ ￿1) = 2W
0 (x1 ￿ x2); (24)
￿V
0 (x2 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿V
00 (x2 ￿ ￿2) = ￿2W
0 (x1 ￿ x2): (25)
Under our hypothesis, V 0 is odd, increasing and V 00 is even, decreasing on R￿
and increasing on R+. Hence, the left hand-side of (24) (resp. (25)) is strictly
monotonic in x1 ￿￿1 on R￿ (resp. in x2 ￿￿2 on R+). As the right hand-side
of (24) and (25) are opposite, the two equations imply x1 ￿￿1 = ￿(x2 ￿ ￿2)
which, together with the binding constraint (21), yields x = ￿dec (￿) as the

















, the value of pro-
gram (20) is strictly less than B￿1;￿2
￿
￿dec￿
. In particular, if the right hand-
side of (18) is positive, ￿B (￿) is negative.
We have argued earlier that if @￿B
@￿1 (￿) ￿ 0, the right hand-side of (18)
must be positive. From what precedes, this implies in turn implies that
￿B (￿) < 0. A symmetric argument yields that for ￿1 < ￿2, @￿B
@￿1 (￿) ￿ 0
implies ￿B (￿) < 0. Finally as ￿B (￿) ￿ 0 whenever ￿1 = ￿2, this implies
that ￿B (￿) ￿ 0 for all ￿ 2 ￿N, the inequality being strict whenever ￿1 6= ￿2.
7.4 Balanced Transfers
We show how propositions 3 and 5 change if we extend ￿quasi-linearly￿our
environment to allow for balanced payments. Observe ￿rst that since trans-
fers are additively separable from the type in the utility function, the deriv-
ative of the utility function w.r.t. the type are not a⁄ected by the transfers.
Therefore, the envelope theorems in lemmas 1 and 2. Since transfers are bal-
anced, they cancel out in the Benthamite criterion and one can easily check
that proposition 5 and its proof are una⁄ected. The envelope theorem in
proposition 3 is unchanged as well. But the conclusion that the mechanism
can be decomposed as ￿(￿) = (￿1 (￿1);￿2 (￿2)) implies an impossibility,
since such a mechanism cannot maximize the sum of utilities, as e¢ ciency
requires in a transferable setup.
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